Decisions, for instance, like that on the _Fu Toy_ case[7] in the United States, and in _Arlidge_ v. _Local Government Board_[8] in England, are clearly a real menace to the liberty of the subject. They suggest a type of executive justice for which the methods of the Star Chamber are the nearest analogy. No body of civil servants, however liberal-minded they may be, ought to be free both to make the law and to devise the procedure by which its legality may be tested; and that, be it remembered, without a power of appeal from their decision. It may be taken for granted that the modern state needs an administrative law; in matters, for instance, like rate-fixing in public utilities, in workmen’s compensation cases, in matters concerning public health, the views of a body of experts in a public department are generally at least as valid as that of the judicial body. But one wants to be certain that in arriving at his decision the expert has been compelled to take account of all the relevant evidence; that the parties to his decision have had their day in court. This seems to me to involve the organization of a procedure for all administrative tribunals which takes account of the lessons we have learned both from the procedure of ordinary courts and from the history of the law of evidence; and it involves an appeal from administrative tribunals to the ordinary courts on all questions where denial of proper procedure is held to involve a denial of proper consideration. Something of this, if I understand the matter aright, has been granted to the American citizen by the Supreme Court in _McCall_ &c. v. _New York_;[9] and I should feel happier about the future of administrative law if I were certain that the principles of that decision applied to all governmental activities of the kind.