Another safeguard is not less essential. We agree, for the most part, in ordinary legal matters that the opinion of a single judge, even when reinforced by the verdict of a jury, ought not to be final in either criminal or civil cases. I should like to see that agreement extended to the sphere of administrative law. Where, that is to say, a departmental tribunal has rendered its decision I should like an appeal to lie to a higher administrative tribunal composed not only of officials, but, also, of laymen of experience in the matters involved who could be trusted to bring an independent mind to the settlement of the matter in dispute. English experience of tribunals like the civil service division of the Industrial Court, and the Commissioners of Income Tax, convinces me that the common sense of a good lay mind is, in this realm, an immense safeguard against departmental error. And we must remember that, however great be the good will of the public services, what, to them, may seem a simple matter of administrative routine, may be to the citizens involved a denial of the very substance of freedom. Certainly a case like _ex parte O’Brien_[10] makes one see how real would be the threat to public liberty if departmental legislation grew without proper judicial scrutiny at every stage of its development. The problem, however, does not merely end here. There are two other sides of administrative action in which the uncontrolled power of the state is an implicit threat to civic freedom. Of the first, I would say here only a word, since I have treated it fully elsewhere.[11] The modern state is a sovereign state and, as such, there are large realms of its conduct where wrong on its part cannot imply the invocation by the citizen of penalty. The right to sue the state in tort seems to me quite fundamental to freedom. The modern state is in essence a public service corporation. Like any other body, it acts through servants who take decisions in its name. I can see no reason in the world why, like any other body serving the public, it should not be responsible for the torts of its agents. If I am run over by the negligent driver of a railway truck, I can secure damages: I do not see why I am not equally entitled to damages if the truck is the property of, and is driven for, the Postmaster-General of His Majesty.[12]