Here, then, the spirit of the Constitution is fully observed, with regard to repetition and also disputation. The Fathers remark that Ignatius "recommends nothing with more urgency than disputation, and constancy in its exercise; so much stress does he lay upon it, as not to let the students of Letters and Grammar go without it."[249] In the lower classes it takes the form of _concertatio_ and mutual challenges, in the matter of Grammar and literary doctrine. Here it is in its full form; and we may pass on to consider it in the next chapter, not as a manner of repetition, but on its own merits. I will make the transition, by quoting an important passage or two from the preliminary _Ratio_. They bear not only on disputation, but on that very essential point, where it is that the vital power for actuating the whole system lies; and what is the intrinsic value of any system, as a mere code of legislation. The critics say that, to counteract the apparent decline of disputation, and to restore this exercise to its ancient form and splendor, everything depends on the vigilance and diligence of those in authority. "Without this, nothing will be effected, even though, for the proper administration of this department of studies, many laws and precepts are put down in writing."[250] Elsewhere, acknowledging in another connection that there is indeed a multitude of points defined for observance, the same writers go on to make these pertinent reflections: "The perfection of doctrine, like the perfection of moral life, stands in need of many aids; whence it is that there is no people under the direction of more laws than the Christian people, nor any Religious Order more under the obligation of Constitution and Decrees than our own." They undertake to prove the advantage of this, both from the side of those in authority, and of those under authority. "Aristotle and St. Thomas," they say, "are both of opinion that as few points as possible should be left to the private opinions of a judge, and as many as possible should be determined by the clear definition of law. They prove it; for it is easier to find the few wise men, whose wisdom is equal to the task of determining fixed rules of guidance, than to find the multitude, which otherwise is required to pass judgment in all contingencies of time and place; there is the sanction of greater maturity in laws which have stood the test of time and experience, than in the off-hand decision of the present hour; there is less of a corrupting influence on law-givers, when they are defining things in general and for the future. Wherefore, whatever can be despatched by general law is so to be despatched; what cannot be provided for by such law is to be left to the judge, as the living rule. Under this head come the particular decisions to be passed in given junctures, whereof the general law cannot take cognizance." So far Aristotle and St. Thomas; and the Fathers of 1586 agree with them.[251] CHAPTER XIV.