descanted on pedagogics, to young people who were never sent to him for that purpose. They are sent to learn definite matter, and to be formed therein on a good plan, by the man who understands it. Then, as Loyola said in another connection, "when they have experienced in themselves the effects thereof," they will be qualified for all the rest, for understanding the plan itself on which they have been formed, and enjoying all the practical results of it; and, if their line of life invites, for understanding other plans too. This is practical wisdom in education; neither dilettantism nor speculation. Fourthly, Aquaviva lays down a principle regarding the public advocacy of opinions. He is not referring to authorities denouncing, or Professors repudiating, them; but merely to certain conditions for putting them forward: "If opinions, no matter whose they be, are found in a certain province or city to give offence to many Catholics, whether members of the Society or not, that is, persons not unqualified to judge, let no one teach them or defend them there, albeit the same doctrines may be taught elsewhere without offence." The word "defence," in a context like this, means publishing and sustaining theses against all comers in public disputations; wherein the Professor represents the school, and the school is put to the account of the Order. The principle seems discreet. If a corporate body does not want to be compromised, it is not for the member to compromise it. If he wants to use the perfect freedom of his opinions, and deliver himself of his own pronouncements, he ought first to assure himself that his circumstances are such as to set him free from representing others. This is an elementary principle of social and urbane existence. The fifth point concerns the march of improvement in the advancement of opinions. It describes the method of discreet development: "In questions which have already been treated by others, let no one follow new opinions, or, in matters which in any way pertain to religion, or are of some consequence, let no one introduce new questions, without consulting the Prefect of Studies, or the Superior. If, then, it still remains dubious, whether the new opinion, or the new question, is permissible, it will be proper for the said authority, in order that things may proceed more smoothly, to learn the judgment of others in the Society upon the subject; and then he will determine what appears best for the greater glory of God." In the sixth and last point, Aquaviva calls attention to a former decree, upon the manner of treating the Aristotelian philosophy.[146] So much for this letter of Aquaviva. On the sense and purport thereof he invited the communication of views from the Order at large, as well as on the document which he encloses, the preliminary _Ratio Studiorum_. To this we may now turn our attention.