At the January term of the supreme court of Ohio in the year 1900 a decision was rendered on the constitutionality of the “Act for the Suppression of Mob Violence” which was passed April 10, 1896.[303] Two cases were before the court. Benjamin F. Church, as the administrator of Charles W. Mitchell, deceased, filed a petition against the board of commissioners of Champaign County to recover five thousand dollars for the lynching of said Mitchell, at Urbana, in said county.[304] Defendant demurred to the petition and the demurrer was sustained by the court of common pleas and the petition dismissed. The circuit court reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas and the case then came before the supreme court. In the other case, J. W. Caldwell brought action, under the same statute, against the board of commissioners of Cuyahoga County, to recover the sum of one thousand dollars for an injury which he alleged that he had received at the hands of a mob in that county. A demurrer to the petition, on the ground that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause for action and that said act was unconstitutional, was sustained by the court of common pleas, and the judgment of the court of common pleas was affirmed by the circuit court. Both cases came up to the supreme court on petitions in error to reverse the respective judgments of the circuit court. In the opinion delivered on April 10, 1900, the supreme court fully discussed and upheld the principle involved in the act, affirming the judgment of the circuit court in Commissioners _v._ Church, administrator of Mitchell, and reversing the judgment of the circuit court and the judgment of the court of common pleas in Caldwell _v._ Commissioners. Church recovered from Champaign County five thousand dollars with interest and costs for the lynching of Mitchell, and Caldwell’s action was sustained for the recovery of one thousand dollars for injuries received at the hands of a mob in Cuyahoga County.[305] The court in its opinion stated specifically that the act was constitutional; that the recovery authorized by said act was penal in its nature, and it was within the legislative power to provide therefor; that such legislation was not an exercise of judicial power, nor was it a violation of the right of trial by jury[306]; that such recovery, and the tax levy authorized and required by said act, were within the general powers of the legislature.[307]