No single statute can be enacted which will put an end to the practice of lynching; nor is it likely that any single measure can be adopted which will effectually suppress lynching. Every measure which will tend to invalidate the excuses offered for the adoption of lynch-law procedure, every measure which will tend to prevent the commission of crimes provoking resort to lynch-law procedure, every measure which will tend to strengthen and maintain a popular reliance on legal procedure, every measure which will in any way tend to create a strong, uncompromising public sentiment against lynching, all of these must be adopted if the practice of lynching is to be made a thing of the past in the United States. CHAPTER IX SOME CONCLUSIONS The question naturally arises, what is the peculiarity about American society which fosters and tolerates lynching? Why is lynching a peculiarly American institution? It has been suggested that the explanation lies along racial lines. Some have said that the Scotch-Irish are responsible for the introduction into this country of the practice of illegally punishing public offenders. Others say that it is race prejudice, a result of the coming together of many races in one country, and particularly that it is the racial antagonism between the white race and the negro race, which explains the matter. Looking at the history of the practice in the United States from colonial times down to the present day, one can scarcely regard such an explanation as either adequate or conclusive. The real explanation lies along a somewhat different line, and it can be pointed out best by drawing some contrasts between the administration of the law in the United States and its administration in the older countries of Europe. The American people are not any more disposed toward lawlessness—they are not less law-abiding—than European peoples; it is rather that they maintain a wholly different attitude toward the law. Social and political conditions are different, and the law, instead of being something in itself to reverence and respect, is little more than a device for securing freedom. The value of laws as rules of conduct is not minimized but there is no sense of sanctity pertaining to them. To outwit, avoid, defy, or forget the laws is not a serious offense so long as an appeal can be made to the individual sense of justice in support of such courses of action.