Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
Disregarding as militarily unimportant the artificial boundary dividing
Canada from New York, Vermont, and the eastern parts of the Union, the
frontier separating the land positions of the two belligerents was the
Great Lakes and the river St. Lawrence. This presented certain
characteristic and unusual features. That it was a water line was a
condition not uncommon; but it was exceptionally marked by those broad
expanses which constitute inland seas of great size and depth, navigable
by vessels of the largest sea-going dimensions. This water system, being
continuous and in continual progress, is best conceived by applying to
the whole, from Lake Superior to the ocean, the name of the great river,
the St. Lawrence, which on the one hand unites it to the sea, and on the
other divides the inner waters from the outer by a barrier of rapids,
impassable to ships that otherwise could navigate freely both lakes and
ocean.
The importance of the lakes to military operations must always be great,
but it was much enhanced in 1812 by the undeveloped condition of land
communications. With the roads in the state they then were, the movement
of men, and still more of supplies, was vastly more rapid by water than
by land. Except in winter, when iron-bound snow covered the ground, the
routes of Upper Canada were well-nigh impassable; in spring and in
autumn rains, wholly so to heavy vehicles. The mail from Montreal to
York,—now Toronto,—three hundred miles, took a month in transit.[88] In
October, 1814, when the war was virtually over, the British general at
Niagara lamented to the commander-in-chief that, owing to the refusal of
the navy to carry troops, an important detachment was left “to struggle
through the dreadful roads from Kingston to York.”[89] “Should
reinforcements and provisions not arrive, the naval commander would,” in
his opinion, “have much to answer for.”[90] The commander-in-chief
himself wrote: “The command of the lakes enables the enemy to perform in
two days what it takes the troops from Kingston sixteen to twenty days
of severe marching. Their men arrive fresh; ours fatigued, and with
exhausted equipment. The distance from Kingston to the Niagara frontier
exceeds two hundred and fifty miles, and part of the way is
impracticable for supplies.”[91] On the United States side, road
conditions were similar but much less disadvantageous. The water route
by Ontario was greatly preferred as a means of transportation, and in
parts and at certain seasons was indispensable. Stores for Sackett’s
Harbor, for instance, had in early summer to be brought to Oswego, and
thence coasted along to their destination, in security or in peril,
according to the momentary predominance of one party or the other on the
lake. In like manner, it was more convenient to move between the Niagara
frontier and the east end of the lake by water; but in case of
necessity, men could march. An English traveler in 1818 says: “I
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account