Materialism; Mind and body; Physiology -- Early works to 1800
Mais on a dû voir que je ne me suis permis le raisonnement le
plus rigoureux et le plus immédiatement tiré, qu'à la suite d'une
multitude d'observations physiques qu'aucun savant ne contestera; et
c'est encore eux seuls que je reconnais pour juges des conséquences
que j'en tire; récusant ici tout homme à préjugés, et qui n'est ni
anatomiste, ni au fait de la seule philosophie qui soit ici de mise,
celle du corps humain. Que pourraient contre un chêne aussi ferme et
solide ces faibles roseaux de la théologie, de la métaphysique et
des écoles; armes puériles, semblables aux fleurets de nos salles,
qui peuvent bien donner le plaisir de l'escrime, mais jamais entamer
son adversaire. Faut-il dire que je parle de ces idées creuses et
triviales, de ces raisonnements rebattus et pitoyables, qu'on fera
sur la prétendue incompatibilité de deux substances qui se touchent
et se remuent sans cesse l'une et l'autre, tant qu'il restera l'ombre
du préjugé ou de la superstition sur la terre? Voilà mon système,
ou plutôt la vérité, si je ne me trompe fort. Elle est courte et
simple. Dispute à présent qui voudra!
MAN A MACHINE.
It is not enough for a wise man to study nature and truth; he should
dare state truth for the benefit of the few who are willing and able
to think. As for the rest, who are voluntarily slaves of prejudice,
they can no more attain truth, than frogs can fly.
I reduce to two the systems of philosophy which deal with man's
soul. The first and older system is materialism; the second is
spiritualism.
The metaphysicians who have hinted that matter may well be endowed
with the faculty of thought{1} have perhaps not reasoned ill. For
there is in this case a certain advantage in their inadequate way of
expressing their meaning. In truth, to ask whether matter can think,
without considering it otherwise than in itself, is like asking
whether matter can tell time. It may be foreseen that we shall avoid
this reef upon which Locke had the bad luck to make shipwreck.
The Leibnizians with their monads have set up an unintelligible
hypothesis. They have rather spiritualized matter than materialized
the soul. How can we define a being whose nature is absolutely unknown
to us?{2}
Descartes and all the Cartesians, among whom the followers of
Malebranche have long been numbered, have made the same mistake. They
have taken for granted two distinct substances in man, as if they
had seen them, and positively counted them.
The wisest men have declared that the soul can not know itself save by
the light of faith. However, as reasonable beings they have thought
that they could reserve for themselves the right of examining what
the Bible means by the word "spirit," which it uses in speaking of
the human soul. And if in their investigation, they do not agree with
the theologians on this point, are the theologians more in agreement
among themselves on all other points?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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