Medical Jurisprudence as it Relates to Insanity, According to the Law of EnglandHaslam, John
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Medical Jurisprudence as it Relates to Insanity, According to the Law of England
Haslam, John
Insanity (Law) -- Great Britain; Mental illness -- Jurisprudence
On those occasions where the madman has been tried in a criminal court,
the counsel for the prosecution has usually and gravely enquired of
the medical evidence, whether the prisoner on ordinary topics and
on subjects unconnected with his insanity, would not converse in
a rational manner: and also whether he did not possess sufficient
understanding to discriminate between GOOD and EVIL, RIGHT and WRONG?
When a medical person is employed concerning any one to whom insanity
is imputed, his principal enquiry is concerning his _in_sanity: it
is not his object to ascertain how much reason he possesses, but how
far, and on what topics he is insane. And having gauged his insanity
he has performed his duty. If it should be presumed that any medical
practitioner is able to penetrate into the recesses of a lunatic’s
mind, at the moment he committed an outrage; to view the internal play
of obtruding thoughts, and contending motives—and to depose that he
knew the GOOD and EVIL, RIGHT and WRONG he was about to commit, it
must be confessed that such knowledge is beyond the limits of our
attainment. It is sufficient for the medical practitioner to know
that his mind is deranged, and that such state of insanity will be
sufficient to account for the irregularity of his actions; and that in
a sound mind, the same conduct would be deemed criminal. If violence
be inflicted by such person during a paroxysm of rage, there is no
acuteness of metaphysical investigation which can trace the succession
of his thoughts, and the impulses by which he is goaded for the
accomplishment of his purpose. And it will be shewn hereafter that in
some instances he is not himself conscious of his actions. Should an
equal injury be inflicted by the crafty and deliberate machinations
of systematic insanity, where the motives to action are delusions,
the scrutiny into the exact procession of thought which produced the
motive, or excited the determination is likewise beyond the reach of
the medical practitioner. As it would be difficult in a person of the
soundest mind to detect the succession of thoughts, tracing that which
was most remote _from_, to that which was proximate _to_, the action;
it can less be expected that the medical evidence should be capable of
noting the consecutive irregularities of a disordered intellect.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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