From what I have already said it must, I should suppose, be now conceded that, at the place where the receptual life of a child first begins to surpass the receptual life of any other mammal, no psychological difference of kind can be affirmed. Let us, therefore, consent to tap this pre-conceptual life at a considerably higher level, and analyze the quality of ideation which flows therefrom: let us consider the case of a child about two years old, who is able to frame such a rudimentary, communicative, or pre-conceptual proposition as _Dit ki_ (Sister is crying). At this age, as already shown, there is no consciousness of self as a thinking agent, and, therefore, no power of stating a truth as true. _Dit_ is the denotative name of one recept, _ki_ the denotative name of another: the object and the action which these two recepts severally represent happen to occur together before the child’s observation: the child therefore denotes them both simultaneously—i.e. _brings than into apposition_. This it does by merely following the associations previously established between the recept of a familiar object with its denotative name _dit_, and the recept of a frequent action with its denotative name _ki_. The apposition in consciousness of these two recepts, with their corresponding denotations, is thus effected _for_ the child by what may be termed _the logic of events_: it is not effected _by_ the child in the way of any intentional or self-conscious grouping of its ideas, such as we have seen to constitute the distinguishing feature of the logic of concepts.