_Case supposed._--Suppose a considerable number of men of undoubted veracity, should, without concert, and agreeing in the main as to particulars, all testify, one by one, that they witnessed, on a given day and hour, some very strange occurrence, as, _e. g._, a ball of fire, or a form of angelic brightness, hovering in the air, over this building, or any like unwonted and inexplicable phenomenon. Are we to withhold or yield our assent? I reply, if the number of witnesses is large, and the testimony concurrent, and without concert, and no motive exists for deception, and they are men of known integrity, especially if they are sane and sober men, not easily imposed upon, I see not how we can reasonably withhold assent. Their testimony is to be taken as true testimony, _i. e._, they did really witness the phenomenon described. The proof becomes stronger or weaker in proportion as the circumstances now mentioned coexist to a greater or less extent, _i. e.._, in proportion as there are more or fewer of these concurring and corroborating circumstances. If there was but a single witness, or if a number of the witnesses were not of the best character, or if there were some possible motive for deception, or if they were not altogether agreed as to important features of the case, so far the testimony would of course be weakened. But we may always suppose a case so strong that the falsity of the witnesses would be a greater miracle than the truth of the story. This is the case with the testimony of the witnesses to our Saviour's miracles. _Distinction to be made._--An important distinction is here to be noticed between the falsity, and the incorrectness, of the witness, between his intention to deceive, and his being himself deceived. He may have seen precisely what he describes; he may be mistaken in thinking it to have been an angel, or a spirit, or a ball of fire. Just as in the case of certain illusions of sense--an oar in the water--the eye correctly reports what it sees, but the judgment is in error, in thinking the oar to be crooked. So the witness may be true, and the testimony true in the case of a supposed miracle or other strange phenomenon; the _appearance_ may have been just as stated, but the question may still be raised, were the witnesses correct, in their inference, or judgment, as to what was the cause of the said appearance, as to _what it was_ that they saw or heard? This must be decided by the rules that govern the proceedings of sensible men in common affairs of life. 2. _Reasoning from Experience._