Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_Not sameness of chemical Composition._--Nor does sameness of chemical
composition constitute identity. This is merely similarity. Two
bodies may be composed of the same chemical elements, in the same
proportion, and possessing the same general form and structure, yet
they are not the same body. A given piece of wood or iron may be
divided into a number of parts, each closely resembling the others,
of the same appearance, size, figure, color, weight, and of the same
chemical components; yet no one of these is identical with any other.
When we say, in such a case, that the different pieces are of the
same material, we use the word _same_ with some latitude, to denote,
not that they are composed of strictly the same particles, that the
substance of the one is the very identical substance of the other,
but only that they consist of the same _sort_ or _kind_ of substance,
that they are, _e. g._, both wood, or both iron. But this does not
constitute identity.
There is no limit to the number of identical bodies which it is
possible to conceive on this theory of identity. The same power that
constructs one body of given chemical elements, and of given form
and structure, may make two such, or ten, and if the first two are
identical, the ten are, and they may exist at one and the same time,
beside each other, identical with each other, yet ten, every one of
which is itself, and yet every one is each of the others!
_A relative Term._--Identity is a relative term, like most others that
are expressive of quality. The term straight implies the idea of that
which is not straight; beauty, the idea of deformity; greatness, its
opposite; and so of others. Identity stands related to _diversity_
as its opposite. To have the idea of identity, is to have that of
diversity also. To affirm the former, is to deny the latter, and to
deny is to have the idea of that which is denied. I do not say there
can be no _identity_ without diversity, but only that there can be no
_idea_ of the one without the idea, also, of the other, any more than
there can be the idea of a tall man without the idea of short men.
_Opposite of Diversity._--To affirm identity, then, is simply to deny
_diversity_, to predicate unity, sameness, oneness. Other objects
there are, like this, it may be, similar in every respect, capable of
being confounded with it, and mistaken for it, but they are _other_
and not _it_. This we affirm when we affirm identity, _non-diversity_,
_non-otherness_. Whatever it be that marks off and distinguishes a
thing from all other like or unlike objects--whatever constitutes its
_individuality_, its _essence_--_in that consists its identity_.
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