Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_Popular Use._--There is a popular use of this term which requires
further notice. We speak of the identity of a mountain, a river, a
tree, or any like object in nature. It is the same mountain, we say,
that we looked upon in childhood, the same tree under which we sat
when a boy, the same river in which we bathed or fished in youth.
Now there is a sense in which this is true and correct. There has
been change of substance unquestionably, and therefore there is not
_absolute_ identity; but there is, after all, _numerical_ sameness,
and this is what we mean when we speak of the sameness or identity of
the object. It constitutes a sufficient ground for such use of terms.
You recognize the book, the mountain, the river, as one you have seen
before. The tree that you pass in your morning walk you recognize as
the very tree under which you sat ten years ago. Leaves have changed,
bark and fibres have changed; branches are larger and more numerous;
boughs, perhaps, have fallen by time and by tempest; it has changed
as you have changed, it has grown old like yourself, with changing
seasons; its verdure and foliage, like your hopes and plans, lie
scattered around it, and yet it is _to you_ the same tree. How so? It
is the same numerical unity. Of a thousand or ten thousand _similar_
trees, similar in species, in growth, and form, and adaptation of
parts, in size, color, general appearance, etc., it is this individual
one, and not some other of the same sort or species growing elsewhere,
that you refer to. It is the same numerical unity and not some other
one of the series. Still there must be continuity of existence in order
to identity even in this popular sense of the term. Were the parts
entirely changed and new ones substituted, as in the puzzle of the
knife with several successive handles and blades, or the ship whose
original timbers, planks, cordage, and entire substance, had, in course
of time, by continued repairs, been removed and replaced by new; in
such a case, we do not ordinarily speak or think of the object as being
any longer the same.
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