_The Cognition distinguished from the Idea of Right._--Having, in the preceding section, discussed the _idea_ of the right, in itself considered, as a conception of the mind, we proceed now to consider _the action of the mind as cognizant of right_. The theme is one of no little difficulty, but, at the same time, of highest importance. _Existence of this Power._--After what has been already said, it is hardly necessary to raise the preliminary inquiry, as to the _existence_ of a moral faculty in man. That we do possess the power of making moral distinctions, that we do discriminate between the right and the wrong in human conduct, is an obvious fact in the history and psychology of the race. Consciousness, observation, the form of language, the literature of the world, the usages of society, all attest and confirm this truth. We are conscious of the operation of this principle in ourselves, whenever we contemplate our own conduct, or that of others. We find ourselves, involuntarily, and as by instinct, pronouncing this act to be right, that, wrong. We recognize the obligation to do, or to have done, otherwise. We approve, or condemn. We are sustained by the calm sense of that self-approval, or cast down by the fearful strength and bitterness of that remorse. And what we find in ourselves, we observe, also, in others. In like circumstances, they recognize the same distinctions, and exhibit the same emotions. At the story or the sight of some flagrant injustice and wrong, the child and the savage are not less indignant than the philosopher. Nor is this a matter peculiar to one age or people. The languages and the literature of the world indicate, that, at all times, and among all nations, the distinction between right and wrong has been recognized and felt. The [Greek: to dikaion] and [Greek: to kalon] of the Greeks, the _honestum_ and the _pulchrum_ of the Latins, are specimens of a class of words, to be found in all languages, the proper use and significance of which is to express the distinctions in question. Since, then, we do unquestionably recognize moral distinctions, it is clear that we have a moral faculty.