_Of Brown._--_Dr. Brown_ divides the sensibilities, to which he gives the general name of _emotions_, with reference to their relation to _time_, as _immediate_, _retrospective_, and _prospective_. Under the former, he includes, as involving no moral feeling, cheerfulness and melancholy, wonder and its opposite, feelings of beauty and the opposite, feelings of sublimity and of the ludicrous; as involving moral feeling, the emotions distinctive of vice and virtue, emotions of love and hate, of sympathy, of pride and humility. Under _retrospective_ emotion he includes anger, gratitude, regret, satisfaction; under _prospective_ emotion, all our desires and fears. _Of Upham._--Prof. Upham divides the sensibilities into the two leading departments, the _natural_ and the _moral_, the former comprehending the _emotions_ and the _desires_, the latter, the _moral sentiments_ or _conscience_. Under the class of desires, he includes our instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections. _Of Hickok._--Dr. Hickok classes the sensibilities under the departments of _animal_, _rational_, and _spiritual_ susceptibility; the former comprehending instincts, appetites, natural affections, self-interested feelings, and disinterested feelings; the second, æsthetic, scientific, ethic, and theistic emotions; while the latter or spiritual susceptibility differs from each of the others, in not being, like them, constitutional, but arising rather from the personal disposition and character. _Remarks on the foregoing Divisions._--Our limits forbid, nor does the object of the present work require, a critical discussion of these several plans of arrangement. It is but justice to say, however, that no one of these several methods of arrangement is altogether satisfactory. They are not strictly scientific. The method of Cogan, for example, derives all our sensibilities ultimately from the two principles of self-love, or desire for our own happiness, and the social principle, or regard for the condition and character of others; which again resolve themselves, according to this author, into the two cardinal and primitive affections of _love_ and _hate_. This division strikes us at once as arbitrary, and, therefore, questionable; and, also, as _ethical_ rather than _psychological_. There are many simple emotions which cannot properly be resolved into either of these two principles. On the other hand, the psychological distinction between the emotions and desires is overlooked in this arrangement. The same remarks apply substantially to several of the other methods noticed.