A military correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_ has recently emphasised the same point. He has pointed out that hitherto the massing of an army of about a quarter of a million men has represented the probable limit of possibilities, and that even then such numbers could only be massed for a short period. The Russo-Japanese war, in which larger numbers were engaged, has by no means disproved this theory, since it partook of the nature of a siege rather than that of a field campaign. At the present moment, the enormous numbers dealt with envolve certain limitations in movement, the scope of which is dictated by the distribution of railways and of roads. Without motor transport, the rate of movement of huge armies would be necessarily very slow, the radius of action from railhead would be small, and the daily movement of the troops would be strictly circumscribed for more reasons than one. The effect of the introduction of motor transport is somewhat similar to that which would be obtained if the railway could, in a few hours, be extended in any direction along any made road for a distance of about forty or fifty miles. The delivery of supplies, as it were in retail, to the troops must still be carried out by horse transport, since motor lorries are not suitable for continuous use where made roads do not exist. The comparatively slow movement of horsed vehicles even now affects the rate of progress of an army. When huge bodies of men are in motion, the depth from the front to the rear of the army is very considerable, and at the end of the day the supplies have to be brought up from the rear to the front in time to enable the whole force to be fed. [Illustration: PART OF BIG FLEET OF “ALBION” LORRIES PURCHASED BY THE BRITISH WAR OFFICE.] [Illustration: A GROUP OF BRITISH “BERNA” LORRIES TAKEN OVER BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT.] [Illustration: A FLEET OF “THORNYCROFT” LORRIES REQUISITIONED FOR SERVICE.] [Illustration: A FLEET OF “HALLFORD” LORRIES CALLED UP IMMEDIATELY ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.]