“In Macedonia a road of any sort was a luxury, the best roads could not compare as regards surface with a fourth-class English roadway, whilst as often as not the motors had to make their own road as they went along. It must be remembered, also, that driving in war time is very different from under peace conditions. Bridges and culverts have usually been destroyed, telegraph lines sag across the road, and at night time are apt to get entangled in the driver’s neck with dire results. I, myself, have seen a goodly number of motor smashes, one when a temporary bridge gave way under an overloaded lorry, another when a contact mine exploded. The worst accident I remember, however, took place soon after the fall of Janina. A very old and depreciated lorry was being used to convey passengers down to Preveza, a distance of sixty-three miles, by a mountain road which for half its length was cut on the edge of a precipice. At one of the awkward places on the road the steering gear broke, and the car with its human freight dashed over the cliff and fell into the river.” The conclusions reached by Captain Trapmann as a result of very exceptional opportunities of observing military motor transport under active service conditions should be of considerable value. His catalogue of desirable features is as follows: (1) Clearance from ground in order to enable a car to pass over rock-strewn stretches. (2) An adjustable cow-catcher in front for use at night on good stretches of road, on which, however, dead or wounded horses or men may be lying. (3) An inclined bullet shield of light steel to protect the front of the radiator from casual sniping. (4) A stout iron hook or ring in front and behind for towing purposes, especially when a river has to be negotiated, the bridge over which has been destroyed. (5) Solid tyres with a set of non-skid chains which can be fitted when occasion arises. (6) A wire grappler to preserve the driver from the danger of sagging telegraph wires hanging across the road. While the experiences detailed in this chapter are, comparatively speaking, on a very small scale, and consequently results cannot confidently be applied in anticipation to a war of immensely greater magnitude, they have at least served to show that even unavoidable lack of experience, or avoidable lack of competence, cannot prevent the motor vehicle from being a very valuable asset behind an army in the field. The Tripoli and Balkan campaigns proved not only the necessity of employing motors for the work of the transport and supply columns, but also the possibility in so doing of saving the lives of very many wounded men who, when dependence was placed on slower methods, frequently died from exposure on their way down from the front to the base. CHAPTER V MOTOR AMBULANCE WORK