=1.= The experience gained at the front in the present campaign may be divided broadly under two heads: Firstly, the test under war conditions of the general principles upon which the British Army has been trained in peace. Secondly, knowledge concerning the tactics of the enemy and his method of employing various arms. With regard to the former of these two heads of information, it is important to note _that the broad principles upon which the training of the British Army has been based are described by a General Officer as being sound, and that the need of paying strict attention to them in carrying out training is emphasized by him_. On the other hand, valuable experience has been gained as to the best method of applying these general principles to the peculiar conditions which have so far prevailed in the present campaign, including the tactics adopted by the enemy. Information based on this experience, more especially so far as it concerns the employment of musketry in attack and defence, is included in these notes, as it may prove useful to officers in training their commands. =2.= These notes, therefore, do not affect the general principles of training laid down in this book. _They merely deal with the application of these principles to the peculiar conditions which have so far obtained in the course of the campaign._ These conditions may at any time give place to others, for it must be remembered that in no two military operations is the situation exactly the same. _Instructors, therefore, must avoid the mistake of training their men for any particular given conditions of warfare, and remember that general principles and broad rules alone are applicable to the leading of troops in war (Infantry Training, 1914)._ =3. German Musketry.=[2]--(i) The Germans consider it unnecessary to teach men to fire at distances beyond 400 metres. Their plan of infantry attack (see diagram, p. ix) is devised to get within this range without opening fire. Accordingly, judging distance is practised by officers only, and no attention is devoted to the indication of targets, concentration of fire, or to fire direction and control generally, as practised in the British Army. To concentrate the fire of a platoon or company on one spot at 1,000 yards range was considered by Germans to be a waste of ammunition. Their training seems to have been limited to independent firing by battalions on large areas of ground. (ii) Only some of their men were practised in rapid firing, which averaged eight or nine rounds a minute, as against the fifteen well-aimed shots a minute which British troops are trained to deliver in rapid firing. In this respect it may be mentioned that the straight bolt of the German rifle is not so easy to work as the bolt of the British rifle, nor is its clip so easy to put in. When put to the test of war, the musketry of the German infantry is characterized by British officers as poor and “lamentable.”