=4. British Musketry.=--On the other hand, the German officer referred to in the footnote below described British musketry under the test of war as “marvellous,” and, in doing so, expressed the views generally held in the German Army as the result of experience. He states that the Germans had counted on being able to rush the British troops by weight of numbers by the plan of attack described in the next paragraph; but they found themselves unable to do so because the British rifle fire was “so straight and so quick.” He added that “they had never had a chance against the British,” because, although they reckoned on their third line with their machine-guns being able to get within 400 yards of the enemy, they had never been able to do this over open ground against the British, because their first line was down too soon--sometimes at 800 to 1,000 yards. Again, on the Aisne, this German officer’s machine-gun battery came under the concentrated fire of British infantry at 1,000 yards, and though his men suffered heavily from it, they were unable to reply to the British, as they were unable to see them. =5. A German Plan of Infantry Attack.=--(i) The diagram on page ix gives a rough idea of a German plan of infantry attack in close formations, as explained by a German officer. The first line is looked on as cover from bullets for the second and third lines, to enable these two lines to get close to the enemy with the minimum of loss. The Germans considered massed formations to be the only way to get up close to the enemy. Both ranks of each line in these formations are close together. When their third line is stopped, they have standing orders to dig in at once, and for this purpose the third line carries shovels and small picks. It has already been explained that, owing to the tremendous effect of British musketry fire, this German plan of attack has repeatedly failed after very heavy loss has been incurred. (ii) As regards fire effect, the Germans had considered the machine-gun to be the most valuable method of discharging bullets, and an enormous amount of time, trouble, and ammunition has been expended on machine-gun training, as well as upon their artillery, upon which they relied largely in their plan of attack. Notes referring to German machine-guns will be found in _Machine-Gun Training_ of this series. =6. German Night Attacks.=--(i) The enemy’s night attacks are made without scouts or advanced parties, and the advance is made with great rapidity. Infantry in trenches must always be ready to open a burst of rapid fire at a few seconds’ notice; so long as this can be done, there will be no chance of a trench being rushed. Supports should be in the cover-trenches, and, when the firing-line is attacked, should not fire, but rely on the bayonet. [Illustration: DIAGRAM SHOWING A GERMAN PLAN OF INFANTRY ATTACK IN CLOSE FORMATIONS.]