Mr. Frothingham's final conclusion is that the "actual tactical result of the battle was indecisive." A very full definition of an indecisive tactical result would be instructive. One result of the battle of Jutland is beyond dispute and is in no way a matter of opinion. These lines are being written on the 12th of May, 1918, close upon two years after the battle of Jutland was fought. Not once during all that long time has the German High Sea Fleet ventured on the high seas or done more than just peep over the edge of its sheltering mine fields. Comment by Mr. Arthur Pollen _Arthur Pollen, the English naval critic, offers the following observations on debatable phases of the battle:_ I have read Mr. Frothingham's article, and it seems to me to be substantially accurate as a synopsis of the officially published events of the afternoon and evening. The writer's comments also seem to be judicious and fair. The battle raises, however, so many and such large problems, strategical, tactical, and technical, that it is impossible for any writer to exhaust the matter, or even to indicate the disputable points in so small a space as Mr. Frothingham has been able to devote to it. In one or two not unimportant particulars I hold a different view of the facts and different opinions from the writer. For example, it seems to me that the Grand Fleet did not, as Mr. Frothingham states on Page 339, at 6:25 form in battle line astern of the battle cruisers. The plan published with the dispatches makes it seem more probable that the van of the Grand Fleet followed a course considerably to the north though parallel to that of the battle cruisers, and that it was not until about 7:05 that they turned from an easterly to a southerly course and formed astern of the Vice Admiral commanding the battle cruiser fleet. The story of the action might have been very different had circumstances permitted of the Grand Fleet going into action astern of the Vice Admiral at 6:15. Again, Page 337, I cannot agree that it is evident that the German fleet was not forced into action with the Grand Fleet, but that Vice Admiral Scheer deliberately chose to engage that force. There is nothing to show that Scheer suspected Jellicoe was on the scene until he began to turn from north to southeast about a quarter of an hour before the Grand Fleet was sighted.