Again, Page 339, I cannot agree that it was the night disposition of the fleet that was the crucial decision. It is true it ended the battle for the night, but the decision which gave the battle its character was taken earlier in the day, when the enemy was allowed to open the range under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens. In the existing atmospheric conditions and light it was impossible for gunnery to be effective, even at 12,000 and 9,000 yards and the only terms on which the German fleet could be defeated and sunk would have been those of close action. The refusal of close action was due to the menace of the German destroyer attacks, used on this occasion for purposes of defense and to afford an opportunity of evasion, with masterly skill and decisive effect. The dispositions and tactics of the night action are a different matter, but of these we are still completely ignorant. Battle of Skagerrak as Germany Sees It By CAPTAIN VON KUEHLWETTER _of the German Imperial Navy_ [This article on the battle of Jutland was written during the week which it was fought, May 31, 1916] Although Trafalgar, Tsushima, and Skagerrak will be treated and discussed together in future naval histories, it is not yet possible to draw the full historical consequences from the two last-named naval battles. We can estimate the effects of Trafalgar on the history of the world, for we know that it laid the foundations of British naval supremacy. With the exception of the immediate military advantage gained, the full results of the battle of Tsushima have not yet been developed. Still less can the battle of Skagerrak have left its impress upon world history. For us Skagerrak [Jutland] has been a great, decisive victory, which our whole High Sea Fleet gained after a long, bitterly contested battle on the open sea, far from the home coast and its points of support, against the superior British Grand Fleet. Our naval forces inflicted upon the British fleet losses which, in terms of tons, even according to the British Admiralty, were double ours. But the tonnage does not fully represent the seriousness of the losses, since the British lost three dreadnoughts, as against one of ours, and three armored cruisers, as against one of our old armored cruisers. If we add to this what our own observations, supported by statements of British prisoners, show, the enemy's losses were three and a half times ours; that is, in terms of fighting units, six dreadnoughts, including two older types, as against one dreadnought and one pre-dreadnought, and four armored cruisers and one small cruiser, as against four small cruisers. The purpose of a battle is destruction, the victor being the side which goes further in this direction. The figures just quoted can leave no doubt on this point.