Nullification, Secession, Webster's Argument, and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions: Considered in Reference to the Constitution and HistoricallyLoring, Caleb William
History
Nullification, Secession, Webster's Argument, and the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions: Considered in Reference to the Constitution and Historically
Loring, Caleb William
Nullification (States' rights); Secession
At the time they were passed little notice was taken of the Kentucky
resolves, owing undoubtedly to the small importance of the declarations
of the Legislature of a State just admitted to the Union with but few
inhabitants. Besides, Kentucky had no claim to original sovereignty. She
owed her existence, the right of government over her territory, and of
expressing her opinions, to the privilege the General Government had
given her to become a State. How with any decency could such a State
claim to be a sovereign, to pass judgment on the legality of the laws of
the United States from whom came her very being?
Then, after all, resolutions are not laws, and these resolutions of
Kentucky (and the same remark applies to the resolutions of all other
States passing judgment on the laws of the United States declaring them
null and void) are merely the opinion of that particular Legislature
that passed them, a sort of harmless suggestion of superior wisdom.
There is no provision in any of our State constitutions authorizing the
Legislature to give such opinions and the next Legislature may pass
others directly contradictory. They are only entitled to respect as
_opinions_, as would be the opinion of any town meeting or synod of
clergymen or assemblage of citizens.
The Kentucky resolutions declare, and it was the first time any such
declaration was made, the same doctrine that Calhoun and Hayne
subsequently maintained; that the several States are united by compact,
under the style and title of a constitution, in a general government for
special purposes, and when the General Government assumes undelegated
powers its acts are void and of no force.
Then comes the doctrine, that this government created by this compact is
not the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated
to it, “but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having
no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as
well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.”
Let us examine this reasoning of the Kentucky resolutions. It is that
the States are united in a general government by a compact, called a
constitution, for special purposes, and when the government assumes
undelegated powers its acts are null and void. There is no objection to
calling the Constitution a compact for special purposes only, and
declaring that the government under it has no right to assume not
granted or undelegated powers, and that any such assumption is void and
of no force.
The only objection to this first clause is the ambiguity in the
declaration that _the several States_ are united by compact. The
Constitution may be called a compact; but it cannot be denied that it
was between the people of the different States. It was not a treaty or
agreement made by the State Legislatures or State governments.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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