On English poetry : $b being an irregular approach to the psychology of this art, from evidence mainly subjectiveGraves, Robert
History
On English poetry : $b being an irregular approach to the psychology of this art, from evidence mainly subjective
Graves, Robert
English poetry -- History and criticism
“Yes,” said Doctor X to me, “somehow the two it’s coming together
look a bit awkward, but I have had a lot of trouble with that
sentence and I came to the conclusion that I’d rather have it
clumsy than obscure.” I pointed out have the “tree-trunk which” was
surely not what he meant, but that the faults of the sentence lay
deeper than that. He was using words not as winged angels always
ready to do his command, but as lifeless counters, weights,
measures, or automatic engines wrongly adjusted. A _grub_ cannot
_manufacture_ a _channel_. Even a human being who can manufacture a
boot or a box can only _scoop_ or _dig_ a channel. And you can only
have a _channel_ on the outer surface of a tree; inside a tree you
have _tunnels_. A tunnel you _drive_ or _bore_. A grub cannot be
_within_ either a channel or a tunnel (surely) in the same way as a
fly is found _within_ a piece of amber. Doctor X excused himself by
saying that “scientists are usually functionally incapable of
visualization,” and that “normal mental visualization is dangerous,
and abnormal visualization fatal to scientific theorizations, as
offering tempting vistas of imaginative synthetical concepts
unconfirmed by actual investigation of phenomena”--or words to that
effect. Unaware of the beam in his own eye, our Doctor complains
more than once in his book of the motes in the public eye, of the
extended popular application of scientific terms to phenomena for
which they were never intended, until they become like so many
blunted chisels. On the other hand, he would be the first to
acknowledge that over-nice definition is, for scientific purposes,
just as dangerous as blurring of sense; Herr Einstein was saying
only the other day that men become so much the slaves of words that
the propositions of Euclid, for instance, which are abstract
processes of reason only holding good in reference to one another,
have been taken to apply absolutely in concrete cases, where they
do not. Over-definition, I am trying to show, discourages any
progressive understanding of the idea for which it acts as
hieroglyph. It even seems that the more precisely circumscribed a
word, the less accurate it is in its relation to other
closely-defined words.
There is a story of a governess who asked her charges what was the
shape of the earth? “It may conveniently be described as an oblate
spheroid” was the glib and almost mutinous answer. “Who told you
girls that?” asked the suspicious Miss Smithson. A scientific elder
brother was quoted as authority, but Miss Smithson with commendable
common sense gave her ruling, “Indeed that may be so, and it may be
not, but it certainly is _nicer_ for little girls to say that the
earth is more or less the shape of an orange.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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