SEC. 18. In the foregoing I have endeavored to make my list of the kinds of sameness complete. I can think of nothing that has been overlooked; but as I have been trying to force a path through a thicket few have made any sustained effort to penetrate, it is quite possible my map of the ground may need emendation. I shall be very glad of any criticism which will help me to improve it. And as the many divisions made, and the many distinctions drawn, may very possibly tend to produce in one who has followed the discussion thus far, a state of mind akin to that of the "true-begotten" Gobbo, when he was obligingly directed to the Jew's house by his hopeful son, a short summary of the results obtained may serve to facilitate apprehension and intelligent criticism. What has been done is this: I began by considering the kinds of sameness of things immediately known, leaving out of consideration for the time being the sameness of the self or ego. This resulted in the following kinds: I. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be said to be the same with itself at any instant. II. Any mental element or complex of mental elements in existence at one time may be called the same with a mental element or complex of mental elements existing at another time, to indicate that the two are similar. III. We may say that we perceive the same object (complex of mental elements) at two different times, when we do not mean that what is actually experienced on the two occasions is the same in either of the preceding senses; but only that the two experiences are terms in a certain series, the whole of which may be regarded as represented by any part. In this sense does one see the same tree on two succeeding days. IV. Any two mental elements or complexes of mental elements in consciousness at the one time may be called the same to mark the fact that they are alike. V. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be called the same with its representative, whether this representative resemble it or not. VI. When a man has learned from experience of his own body (as a thing immediately known) that a consciousness of his body in a certain peculiar relation to a given object (complex of mental elements) is a presupposition to a consciousness of the object, and wishes to mark the fact that he is perceiving or imagining two human bodies in this relation to a single object, and connecting in thought with each of them a picture of the object, he may say that he is perceiving or imagining two men seeing the same object. This sense of the word same obviously expresses quite a complex thought.