As to the sixth kind of sameness. May we grant this to the self, if by self we mean the formal element of consciousness? I have said a little way back, before taking up the distinction of formal and material, that, if we make the word self cover all the immediately known, there is nothing to prevent one's saying that two men see a part of the same self, for material objects (immediately known) would have to be regarded as such parts. And here it is evident that if we make self to cover the whole of the formal element in a consciousness, it of course includes the formal element in what we may call the objective side of consciousness--the side which is, in some sense of the words, common and impersonal. Now, we do say that two men see the same tree, and by tree, the man who distinguishes between form and matter means a certain complex containing both formal and material elements. These elements he believes he can distinguish from one another, and pay attention predominantly now to the one, and now to the other. Does it not seem to follow that a man may as truly be said to see the formal element as the material, and that two men who see the same tree may with justice be said to see the same shape or arrangement of parts? In other words, may we not apply the sixth sense of the word same to the formal element in consciousness if this element is a thing capable of treatment at all? And if this formal element in a tree seen by two men is a part of the self, why may we not say that two men see a part of the same self, even though we make self mere form? It would sound very odd to say so, of course, but that should not weigh with a philosopher, if consistency require it. Finally, if I may call an immediately perceived object the same with its supposed "external" correlate, not confounding the two, but merely marking by the word a peculiar instance of the representative relation, why may I not, if I believe that "external" things stand in "real" relations to each other truly represented by our perceptions of things and their relations--why, in this case, may I not speak of the relations, "external" and "internal," as the same, without on that account forgetting that I am pointing out a relation between two things (if I may thus speak of relations), numerically different? Are they not as different as the "matter" of consciousness and its correlate in the "outer" world?