I have said that, in the extract given, a line is drawn between samenesses which imply duality and the sameness which does not; and yet such illustrations are used to represent the latter as a man, a table, and a ship--objects which are the same in sense third as well as in sense first, and which consequently imply duality, in some sense of the word. But, if one is not considering single members of the chain of experiences which, taken together, we call a man, but is considering the whole group as a unit, this difficulty disappears. This is evidently what Mill has in mind, and he cannot be taxed with inconsistency. One may, however, object to the statement that it is an improper use of the word same to speak of things merely similar as the same. The word has many meanings, and we can hardly say that any one of them is illegitimate. It is merely illegitimate to confound them. And one should not take quite literally the description of resemblance in the highest degree as "amounting to undistinguishableness." Strict undistinguishableness removes all duality, and consequently makes impossible what we call resemblance or similarity. To be similar, things must be distinguished as two. Finally, one may object to a treatment of samenesses which merely groups them into two classes, when there are at least seven kinds that should, in the interests of clear thinking, be kept separate. It is only by carefully marking such distinctions that fallacious reasonings are to be avoided. As, however, this discussion of samenesses is merely a side issue where it occurs in the Logic, it would perhaps be unjust to blame Mill for not going into it more fully. SEC. 34. At this point I leave the realms of the dead and emerge into the land of the living. The errors that I have been criticizing still live, and it would not be difficult to glean a goodly number of them from the authors of our day. I shall be moderate, and will content myself with one or two representative instances. It would be surprising if as loose and incautious a reasoner as Mr. Herbert Spencer did not furnish some examples of confused samenesses. To certain of his errors in this direction I have briefly referred in the earlier part of my monograph. Here I shall treat of him a little more at length, though even here it is impossible to do justice to the subject, as that would involve my quoting and commenting upon at least a large part of the first division of the "First Principles." I shall take only the conclusion of the argument by which he establishes the existence of his "Unknowable," or "Inscrutable Power," or "Ultimate Cause," or "Unseen Reality," or "Absolute." This contains two confusions of no little significance. Mr. Spencer writes: