On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
"Hence our firm belief in objective reality--a belief which
metaphysical criticisms cannot for a moment shake. When we are taught
that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, cannot
be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions produced
on us, we are yet, by the relativity of our thought, compelled to
think of these in relation to a positive cause--the notion of a real
existence which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be
proved to us that every notion of a real existence which we can frame
is utterly inconsistent with itself--that matter, however conceived
by us, cannot be matter as it actually is, our conception, though
transfigured, is not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality,
dissociated as far as possible from those special forms under which
it was before represented in thought. Though Philosophy condemns
successively each attempted conception of the Absolute--though it
proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that--though
in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as it
arises; yet, as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness,
there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The
continual negation of each particular form and limit, simply results in
the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits; and so
ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited.
"And here we come face to face with the ultimate difficulty--How can
there possibly be constituted a consciousness of the unformed and
unlimited, when, by its very nature, consciousness is possible only
under forms and limits? If every consciousness of existence is a
consciousness of existence as conditioned, then how, after the negation
of conditions, can there be any residuum? Though not directly withdrawn
by the withdrawal of its conditions, must not the raw material of
consciousness be withdrawn by implication? Must it not vanish when the
conditions of its existence vanish? That there must be a solution of
this difficulty is manifest; since even those who would put it, do,
as already shown, admit that we have some such consciousness; and the
solution appears to be that above shadowed forth. Such consciousness
is not, and cannot be, constituted by any single mental act; but is
the product of many mental acts. In each concept there is an element
which persists. It is alike impossible for this element to be absent
from consciousness, and for it to be present in consciousness alone:
either alternative involves unconsciousness--the one from the want of
the substance; the other from the want of the form. But the persistence
of this element under successive conditions, _necessitates_ a sense of
it as distinguished from the conditions, and independent of them. The
sense of a something that is conditioned in every thought, cannot be
got rid of, because the something cannot be got rid of. How then must
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account