On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
[27] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3d ed., p. 41; cf. Green,
Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9: "To a being who is simply a result of
natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning."
[28] Cf. The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 293 ff.
[29] Cf. Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 577.
[30] Cf. J. Grote, 'Utilitarian Philosophy,' p. 20, note: "One kind
of pleasure may be, systematically, to be preferred to another, but
it must be because the pleasures classified under it generally exceed
those under the other in intensity, or some other of the elements of
value."
CHAPTER III.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.
[Sidenote: 1. Different standpoints of individual and state]
It still remains possible, of course, to fix an ethical end in some
other way than by studying individual human nature. We may, for
instance, looking from the point of view of the community, fix its
greatest happiness, instead of his own, as the individual's end. But
the difficulty then arises of persuading the individual--or, indeed,
making it possible for him--to regard this impersonal goal as the
end of his conduct. For this purpose, Bentham seemed to look to the
exercise of administrative control which, by a system of rewards
and punishments, will make the greatest happiness of the individual
coincide so far as possible with that of the community.[31] J. S.
Mill, on the other hand, with his eyes turned to the subjective
springs of action, saw in the gradual growth of sympathetic pleasures
and pains the means by which an individual's desires would cease to
conflict with those of his neighbours.
It is in some such way that the transition is made from Egoism to
Utilitarianism. The transition is made: Bentham and his school are
an evidence of the fact. But it is not therefore logical. It is,
indeed, important to notice that we only pass from the one theory to
the other by changing our original individualistic point of view.
Having already fixed an end for conduct regardless of the difference
between the individual at the time of acting and at subsequent times,
we proceed to take the much longer step of ignoring the difference
between the agent and other individuals. The question is no longer,
What is good or desirable for the person who is acting? but, What is
best on the whole for all those whom his action may affect--that is
to say, for the community?
[Sidenote: cannot be logically connected]
[Sidenote: through analogy of state to individual.]
[Sidenote: Difference between one's own pleasure and the pleasure of
others]
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