On the Ethics of NaturalismSorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Philosophy
On the Ethics of Naturalism
Sorley, W. R. (William Ritchie)
Ethics; Ethics, Evolutionary
But while it is comparatively easy to see how this transition
is effected as a matter of fact, it is difficult to establish
any logical connection between its different stages, or to offer
any considerations fitted to convince the individual that it is
reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the community rather than
his own. Only that conduct, it may seem, can be reasonable which
directs and perfects the natural striving of each organism towards
its own pleasure. We may, of course, let our point of view shift from
the individual to the social "organism." And in this case, if the
"natural" end of each human being is his own greatest pleasure, the
end of the community, or organised body of pleasure-seekers, will
naturally be concluded to be the greatest aggregate pleasure of its
members. Thus, if we can hypostatise the community, and treat it as
an individual with magnified but human wants and satisfactions, then,
for this leviathan, the ethical end will correspond to what is called
Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism. But, when we remember
that the community is made up of units distinct from one another
in feeling and action, the difficulty arises of establishing it as
the natural end, or as a reasonable end, for each of these units to
strive after the greatest pleasure of all. For it is evident that the
pursuit of the greatest aggregate pleasure may often interfere with
the attainment by the individual of his own greatest pleasure. On the
other hand, the self-seeking action of the individual may no doubt
lead to a loss of pleasure on the whole; but then it is not his own
pleasure that is lost, only other people's. To the outsider--as to
the community--it may seem irrational that a small increase in the
pleasure of one unit should be allowed at the expense of a loss of
greater pleasure on the part of other units. But it seems irrational
only because the outsider naturally puts himself in the place of
the community; and neither takes account of the fact that to the
individual agent there is a fundamental difference between his own
pleasure and any one else's pleasure: for him the former is, and the
latter is not, pleasure at all.[32]
[Sidenote: overlooked in arguing from egoism to utilitarianism.]
This fundamental difference seems to be overlooked when the attempt
is made to argue logically from egoistic psychology (or even from
egoistic ethics) to utilitarianism. Indeed, the hiatus in logical
proof is often only concealed by a confusion of standpoints; and
J. S. Mill, while emphasising the distinction between modern
Utilitarianism and the older Epicureanism, has even allowed his
official "proof" of utilitarianism--such proof, that is, as he
thinks the principle of Utility to be susceptible of--to rest on the
ambiguity between individual and social happiness.
[Sidenote: 2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according
to Bentham:]
[Sidenote: (_a_) Utilitarianism not a political duty,]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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