On the Nature of Thought: Or, The act of thinking and its connexion with a perspicuous sentenceHaslam, John
Philosophy
On the Nature of Thought: Or, The act of thinking and its connexion with a perspicuous sentence
Haslam, John
Thought and thinking
It may excite some surprise that an Essay on Thought should be connected
with the construction of a perspicuous sentence. To explain this
conjunction, it may be urged, that there can be no evidence of thought,
until it is promulgated by speech or written character: and, on all
important occasions, such communications of meaning become absolutely
necessary. Acquiescence or dissent may indeed be tacitly conveyed, by
holding up the hand, or by ballot, without condescending to offer any
verbal reasons for the adoption or rejection of the proposed measure.
Affirmation or negation does not in any manner constitute Thought; such
determination may result from caprice, from ignorance, or from
prejudice, without the slightest consideration. Thought requires some
proposition clearly conceived and perspicuously expressed in a sentence;
and the clearness of the Thought will be ascertained by the perspicuity
of its verbal expression. There may be some difficulty respecting the
precise meaning of individual words, arising from the corruptions of the
ignorant; but more especially from the perversions of writers who have
been deemed authorities. This distortion of the original sense, is, in a
certain degree, incidental to all living languages, which being in
childhood acquired by the ear, the learner is compelled to adopt the
signification of words, and employ the current phraseology of those with
whom he associates. When he is subsequently taught to speak and write by
rule, or grammatically, generally at an age anterior to the exercise of
reason, he is coerced to imbibe that which is forced in the way of
instruction. Even at a more advanced period the student cannot readily
comprehend how a perspicuous sentence is formed by the position of
individual words, each bearing a distinct signification, which it is
presumed must be the fact: but Mr. DUGALD STEWART, in his _Philosophical
Essays_, _p._ 155, has introduced a doctrine entirely opposite to this
well-founded position. "So different is all this from the fact, that our
words when examined _separately_, are _often_ as completely
insignificant as the letters of which they are composed: deriving their
meaning _solely_ from the connexion, or relation in which they stand to
others."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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