What is here said, is, no doubt, in accordance with the doctrines which we have endeavoured to establish respecting the nature of Science, if by this _Intuition_ we understand that contemplation of certain Fundamental Ideas, which is the basis of all rigorous knowledge. But notwithstanding this apparent approximation, Aristotle was far from having an habitual and practical possession of the principles which he thus touches upon. He did not, in reality, construct his philosophy by giving Unity to that which was manifold, or by seeking in Intuition principles which might be the basis of Demonstration; nor did he collect, in each subject, fundamental propositions by an induction of particulars. He rather endeavoured to divide than to unite; he employed himself, not in combining facts, but in analysing notions; and the criterion to which he referred his analysis was, not the facts of our experience, but our habits of language. Thus his opinions rested, not upon sound inductions, gathered in each case from the phenomena by means of appropriate Ideas; but upon the loose and vague generalizations which are implied in the common use of speech. Yet Aristotle was so far consistent with his own doctrine of the derivation of knowledge from experience, that he made in almost every province of human knowledge, a vast collection of such special facts as the experience of his time supplied. These collections are almost unrivalled, even to the present day, especially in Natural History; in other departments, when to the facts we must add the right Inductive Idea, in order to obtain truth, we find little of value in the Aristotelic works. But in those parts which refer to Natural History, we find not only an immense and varied collection of facts and observations, but a sagacity and acuteness in classification which it is impossible not to admire. This indeed appears to have been the most eminent faculty in Aristotle's mind. The influence of Aristotle in succeeding ages will come under our notice shortly. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 11: _Metaph._ xii. 4.] [Footnote 12: _Hist. Ind. Sc._ b. i. c. iii. sect. 2.] [Footnote 13: _Analyt. Prior._ i. 30.] [Footnote 14: _Analyt. Post._ i. 18.] [Footnote 15: _Analyt. Prior._ ii. 23, περὶ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.] [Footnote 16: _Analyt. Post._ ii. 19.] [Footnote 17: But the best reading seems to be not ἔν τι but ἔτι: and the clause must be rendered "both to perceive and to retain the perception in the mind." This correction does not disturb the general sense of the passage, that the first principles of science are obtained by finding the One in the Many.] [Footnote 18: _Analyt. Post._ i. 34.] [Footnote 19: _Ibid._ ii. 19.] CHAPTER V. ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON ARISTOTLE.