(M70) It appears from the evidence reviewed hitherto, that any great-grandson could inherit from any grandson of a common ancestor, and the conclusion also seems to be justified, that the group of great-grandsons were considered to divide up their right to inherit once for all, and that having done so, with respect to that inheritance they were considered to have begun a new succession. To put it differently, in case of the death of one of these second cousins, after the final division of their inheritance had taken place, the rest of the second cousins would have no right to a share in his portion; an heir would have to be found within his nearer relations. Thus, they share responsibilities towards any of their relations within the group and higher up in their families, and also stand shoulder to shoulder in sharing such burdens as pollution and so on, but are outside the immediate ἀγχιστεία with respect to each other’s succession. The reason for this will perhaps be more apparent as the argument proceeds. That the grandson of a first cousin was outside the ἀγχιστεία is clear from the speech of Demosthenes already mentioned,(149) where the plaintiff, who originally stands in that relationship to the deceased whose inheritance is in dispute, is adopted as son of his grandfather (first cousin of the deceased), in order to come within the legal definition of ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς. That the son of a second cousin was also without the pale is directly stated in several passages in Isaeus. (M71) It must be remembered that by “inheritance” is meant the assumption of all the duties incumbent on the ἀγχιστεύς, and that the man who “inherited” took his place for the future as son of the deceased in the family pedigree, and reckoned his relationship to the rest of the γένος thenceforth from his new position, in the house into which he had come.(150) (M72) Now if it is true that to the great-grandson was the lowest in degree to which property could directly descend without entering a new οἶκος, and if that great-grandson was also looked upon as beginning with his acquired property a new portion of the continuous line of descent; any one, who “inherited” from him and ranked in the scale of relationship as HIS SON, would necessarily fall outside the former group and would be considered as forming the nearest relative in the next succeeding group. This, it seems, is the meaning of the language of the law which limits the ἀγχιστεία to the children of first cousins who could inherit from their parent’s first cousins, and still _retain their relationship as great-grandsons_ of the same ancestor. Whereas any one taking the place of son to his second cousin would be one degree lower down in descent, and pass outside the limit of the four generations. The law makes the kinsmen therefore exhaust all possible relationships _within the group_ by reverting to the mother’s kindred with the same limitation before allowing the inheritance to pass outside or lower down.