THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE Public opinion puzzled by military problems 309 The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) 310 Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game 312 'The blood taxes' 313 The nation realised it had not been treated with candour 313 Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace 314 Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commensurate to her population, policy, and resources 316 CHAPTER II THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY The _Regular Army_ 317 Three classes of reserves 318 The _Army Reserve_ 318 The _Special Reserve_ 319 The _Territorial Army_ 320 The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 321 These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple Entente 322 In the _onset_ period untrained and half-trained troops were of no use 322 Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 323 Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 324 Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis 326 Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 326 Size of British striking force necessary as complete were of against a coolly calculated war 327 Reserves required behind this striking force 328 South African War no precedent for a European war 330 CHAPTER III LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 332 Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 332 Attack concentrated on three passages 333 Two of these have been proved true by events 334 The other was misinterpreted by its critics 335 Liberal criticism 336 Unionist criticism 341 Ministerial rebukes 343 No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these attacks 347 CHAPTER IV LORD KITCHENER'S TASK