But all this talk had not been without its effect, and the result was that it was not considered ridiculous that a large force of mounted men should be frittered away in ineffective dismounted action, sitting all day on a hill or ridge, and firing at great distances at an equally sticky enemy. Such action is a slur on cavalry for whom “Action and again action” is the motto. If both cavalries work on this principle, and this was often the case both in the early portion of the South African War[40] and in the Manchurian campaign, certainly no important combats will take place; but, directly one side begins to “push,” mounted combats will result, and as each side finds that the greatest number of squadrons, _ceteris paribus_, wins, there will be great combats of masses, and a “fight to a finish” amongst the cavalry on the flank of the great general encounter. As we have said, in the South African War during the first year, with few exceptions, fire at long distances and infinitely wearisome tactics were the rule; it was only in the last year of the war that the British cavalry, colonials, and mounted infantry--their attack in some cases supported by really effective and _à propos_ artillery and machine-gun fire--began to push and gallop at the Boers at every opportunity. Then the Boers always galloped away, but gradually they, too, learnt from us the value of pushing, and Botha, Delarey, and others executed some good charges with marked effect, but they never attempted, and wisely so, to charge men armed with swords. That was too much for the cavalry soldier to hope for. In the Manchurian War the Japanese, with their small force of cavalry, wisely played the defensive game; the Russians,[41] trained and organized for twenty years on wrong principles, and led without much attempt at reasoned dash or enterprise, seldom imposed their will on the enemy, or made any effort to push in with their numerous squadrons and sotnias on an open flank. If there was an exception it was when, before the battle of Mukden, a force of Cossacks under General Liubarin attacked the Japanese right flank in the mountains, and are stated to have “rendered the situation critical” till driven off by mixed forces of infantry and cavalry. This is given as one of the few cavalry lessons of the Manchurian War. The Russian cavalry officer had not received sufficient training in grand tactics, nor does the combined action of their horse artillery with cavalry appear to have been in any respect effective.