The lesson for our cavalry from these two wars appears to be, that we should teach our officers to think about something bigger than the tactics of a squadron or regiment, to learn _esprit d’armée_, to remember that a few independent squadrons cut up rarely influence a war, whereas in every big combat the result (and that result may be affected largely by the leading of a few squadrons) is a national matter. And there always recurs the most supreme question for the cavalry leader of masses on the battlefield, whether, apart from the cases in which a sacrifice is necessary, the anticipated results are in any way proportionate with the stake. Even the riding down of an infantry brigade will not always compensate for the expenditure of a cavalry division. Langlois pictures “cavalry with its light batteries in the decisive attack moving by ways which are hidden from view and fire ... falling on the enemy in mass and surprising him. Reconstructing his (the enemy’s) defences, and keeping hostile troops at a distance, measures which,” he says, “require a short dismounted fight, then part of the cavalry advance and harass and prevent the enemy returning, whilst the rest holds the position with fire. The infantry will follow the cavalry as quickly as possible.” There is no more important subject of training for the cavalry officer than cavalry action on the battlefield of all arms. Theoretical study is not enough, it is absolutely necessary to study in the field with troops or flags representing troops. Since cavalry action is almost invariably[42] on the flanks, staff rides, cavalry instructional rides, manœuvres, and other exercises can commence by dealing with only one flank, thus half the number of men, flags, etc., will suffice. The director should never permit one side to know the strength in any arm on the other side; this is desirable, if only to increase the difficulty and value of gaining information by reconnaissance in these exercises. For this purpose a proportion of cavalry-scouting parties should be detailed. Too much stress can scarcely be laid on this essential of training. Cavalry can now simulate infantry, smokeless powder renders it impossible to judge the volume of fire, every bit of information has to be fought for, and will cost the lives of both horses and men. Even the boldest and most cunning scouting, without fighting, will not lead to any certain information; it is “peacetime talk” to imagine that it will be otherwise. Having this in view, the director should lay the greatest stress on dash and enterprise as opposed to stickiness and a desire to do nothing or await further report. It is at these exercises that the director can go far to establish a _doctrine_, that of the resolute offensive.