Of close co-operation by the horse artillery in the charges of cavalry against infantry there is practically little or no trace in the battles of 1870. The training of cavalry and horse artillery and the organization of the cavalry division had not proceeded on these lines, as is evident from the fact that there is no mention of it in books such as Von Schmidt before that war, or in Prince Kraft’s _Letters on Cavalry_ after it. The latter writer shows that the tendency was to deprive the cavalry division of its horse artillery when a battle took place, and put it with the corps artillery. It was claimed that by so doing the horse artillery were practically of double use. The batteries remain as a rule with the corps artillery. If the cavalry division is sent forward, they are attached to it. If a battle takes place during which the cavalry division is held in reserve, then the horse artillery becomes again a part of the corps artillery and considerably augments its fire. The horse artillery of the Guards corps was thus employed in 1870. For a cavalry division which takes part in a great battle _does not require any horse artillery_. It is held at first in reserve. If it is called upon to attack it is obliged to make use of an opportunity of charging broken troops of the enemy. There is thus no need to break up its enemy with artillery fire, and there is, besides, no time to do so. Compare with the above the 1907 amendments to the German _Exerzier Reglement für die Kavallerie 1895_, No. 375: In a general engagement the batteries and machine guns told off to the cavalry _will remain with them_, because they are indispensable to the cavalry in the fulfilment of their special duties during, and particularly after, the battle. The cavalry leader must, however, judge whether the general position does not rather demand the employment of his batteries in co-operation with the rest of the artillery. The horse artillery and machine guns will be of the greatest use in a general engagement when the cavalry are operating against the enemy’s flanks and rear. Their sudden appearance from a flank or from the rear is certain to produce a strong moral effect on the enemy. There could scarcely be a greater _volte face_ than is indicated by these two extracts. Further, what we read of the use of masses of cavalry at the present date, in both the German and French manœuvres, leads us to the conclusion that their cavalry and horse artillery will be kept together in a general engagement and used for the sledge-hammer blow on both shaken and unshaken infantry.