The reader should study some of the instances given in Colonel Maude’s book, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, chaps. xi. and xii., of the charges by cavalry on infantry in the 1870 war, and picture to himself what would have been the results if these charges had been preluded by even five minutes’ gun fire of one battery of modern horse artillery, say 350 accurately placed shells, containing in all 83,600 projectiles. A conclusion early arrived at in the consideration of the rôle of the three arms on the modern battlefield is that no artillery and infantry force, however strong, can afford to enter upon a battle unless their flanks are protected by natural obstacles or by masses of cavalry. But battles, except where we adopt the defensive, are not fought where natural obstacles cover our flank. Therefore, we must have sufficient cavalry if only to neutralize the enemy’s cavalry, otherwise they will work round our flank and attack our reserves, and, if they are accompanied by horse artillery, whilst our horse and field artillery is already engaged in the great battle, they possess a marked advantage over us. The latest instance of the need of cavalry and horse artillery is furnished by Captain Spaits, who himself went through the retreat with the Russians after Mukden, in his book, _With Cossacks through Manchuria_. He “and many others who realized the panic-stricken frame of mind of the masses of men who were pouring back without arms and without discipline” are of opinion that a “couple of good cavalry divisions, energetically led and provided with artillery and machine guns, could have turned the retreat into a complete annihilation of the army.” The above inference is obvious when one considers the impression made on the flying troops by a few hundred indifferent horsemen.[55] Having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that cavalry with horse artillery have a great rôle on the battlefield against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the attack is _à propos_, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against infantry should take. _Cavalry Training_ indicates that it should be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with the infantry commander in that portion of the field.