An example of the “counter-attack by a cavalry division on hostile infantry in order to gain time for reserves to come up” is given in General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, p. 40: The problem here presented is one of considerably more danger and difficulty than that of completing the rout of beaten troops and reaping the fruits of victory. The enemy’s infantry, far from having lost their _moral_, are pressing victoriously to the attack, and, though the leading echelons may have sustained heavy losses from the fire of the defence, there are troops in reserve and support which retain their cohesion and steadiness. The responsibility for ordering an attack of this nature ... rests with the commander-in-chief. Against such an objective it is useless to send regiments at the gallop. It is necessary to (1) prepare the attack, concentrate the means for it, and bring a converging fire of guns, machine guns, and infantry upon the objective; (2) make a definite plan. This must be based on what can be seen of the enemy and his position, the use of ground, the most opportune moment; (3) dispose the troops methodically by the execution of the plan, and assign to them, if possible, their objectives; (4) give the signal for the attack at the right moment. In the _Manual of Infantry Training_, 1905, under “Formations Applicable to Savage Warfare,” is found S. No. 118, which contains an instruction for “Meeting an Attack by Cavalry or Swordsmen.” When a battalion in line is threatened by cavalry or swordsmen in force, it may sometimes be desirable to dress back the threatened flank and to dress up the unmenaced flank, the battalion commander giving the command, “Back, No. ----, up, No. ----.” Such a formation if adopted in ordinary warfare against cavalry would favour the fire of artillery and machine guns, if the latter are placed at right angles to the attack as indicated above. May, writing in 1896, _Guns and Cavalry_, says: True, there may be opportunities when cavalry and horse artillery moving rapidly, even during the progress of a great battle, may anticipate the foe at some decisive point, and may make or prevent a telling flank movement. But for such occasions special arrangements could no doubt be made as the exigencies of the moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for them beforehand. It is evident from the German regulations quoted above that they have no intention of trusting to the “Special arrangements” for “Exigencies.” Their reasons no doubt are somewhat as follows: 1st. Horse artillery is an integral part of the cavalry. 2nd. Attacks on unshaken infantry depend upon horse artillery for such a preparation as will speedily reduce infantry to shaken infantry.