That the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. As far as the troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two points which demand forethought and arrangement. The first is the best position for the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. In these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it--and we may turn to the memoirs of Napoleon for the solution. He says: “A flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable of deciding victory in itself.” The ideal then appears to be: “A,” when the fire effect is delivered at right angles to the direction of the successive lines of cavalry; and “B,” when the rallying-point is fixed on the flank away from the general engagement and under cover from the enemy’s fire; “C,” when we utilize surprise. It is usually in the return from such enterprises after rallying that nine-tenths of the loss takes place. A good instance is that of Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth; see page 203, Maude’s _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_. Suddenly the wreck of the ten squadrons of Michel’s Brigade, now making the best of their way back at full speed, but still preserving some attempt at formation, appeared right in rear of the Prussians. The latter at once wheeled troops about and charged at full gallop from the halt. Owing to the suddenness of the attack there was no time to deploy, though the outer troops attempted to gallop up into line; but the shock was sufficient to discomfort the French. There was a short mêlée, and then the Prussians, promptly rallying, swept up the debris of the French, and brought in some sixty prisoners and many riderless horses. The prompt resolution to attack and the rapid rally both deserve very high commendation. Many writers of recent date, and especially those who are impressed with an exaggerated idea of the accuracy of rifle fire, those, in fact, of the De Bloch School, are under the impression that cavalry will not charge infantry. It is probable that, never having ridden in a force of cavalry passing through a fire-swept zone, they are unaware how much simpler it is than the attack on cavalry or artillery, and how much less resolution is needed. In the case of cavalry there is the apparently inevitable concussion which is seen to be nearing; in the former a few men or horses drop almost unnoticed by their comrades, but most of them “carry on” for a long way after being hit. As the enemy are reached, the desire for slaughter overrides all other thoughts; cavalry should then be taught to go straight on, taking with the point what comes to them and riding their horses at speed in the direction of the rallying-point.