Tired to death and resigned to their fate, the whole of the infantry were slowly crawling towards the wood. Suddenly the murderous fire ceased. Every one stopped, astonished, to see what had saved them from the fate which seemed certain to them. Then they saw the French cuirassiers who, as they pushed forward, _masked the fire_ of their infantry and artillery. These cuirassiers appeared to them like guardian angels. With the most perfect calm every man halted on the spot where he stood and fired at the cuirassiers, who were soon swept away by the rapid fire. He adds at p. 67: We see, moreover, that cavalry charges, if they break out from the front of their own infantry and _mask the fire of the latter_, enable the infantry which is charged to gain time, owing to the cessation of this fire, to recover their formation. The above is one more argument in favour of constantly training our cavalry leaders till it is a second nature to apply shock at right angles to fire effect, and on no account whatever to mask the fire of their own artillery and infantry, and thus become the “guardian angels” of the infantry whom they are attacking. Von Bernardi appears to lose sight of this, when he says, p. 208, _Cavalry in Peace and War_: It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the formation, for the attack, must take place beyond the effective range of the enemy’s fire ... and nothing else can be done but to gallop straight to the front. As, however, our infantry will have to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case to attack in close order. This is what we consider should be avoided in the dispositions of the cavalry leader. Again, p. 200, Von Bernardi says: “The attack will best take place from the flank.” To this there is the objection that there is not likely to be a good rallying-point in the middle of the enemy’s line. Our conclusion is that these attacks will be least costly if they break out from our line in valleys running at right angles to it, or round the contour of a hill, and sweep the enemy by a charge parallel to our front, and that the rallying-point should be outside the flank or within our own line. On the occasions when our infantry or dismounted riflemen made one of their regular attacks in extended order on the positions taken up by the Boers, there were almost invariably not only critical moments, but also opportunities afforded by the lie of the ground which invited a leader at the head of three or four squadrons of lancers to issue from cover in or near the Boer lines at a gallop in open order, and to sweep over the widely extended men. Three to four minutes at most would have covered the time during which these lancers would have been exposed to fire; then they could have reached a rallying-point in their own lines.