There are good grounds for the belief that such an attack is extremely demoralizing, especially if the troops have not been accustomed in peace-time to undergo it. CHAPTER XIII IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY “The most arduous, while at the same time the most important, duties that devolve upon soldiers in the field are those of outposts ... all concerned should feel that the safety of the army and the honour of the country depend upon their untiring vigilance and activity.”--LORD WOLSELEY. The art of maintaining himself and his command in the outpost line is a question of vigilance, imagination, and forethought on the part of the commander, and cunning on the part of his men. Let us place ourselves in the position of an officer commanding a hundred to two hundred men, and detached some ten miles out to the flank and front of a force. The commander must take it for granted that he may be attacked at any moment, and so he must run through in his mind what he intends to do. It is his business to look ahead and foresee dangers and misfortunes--and by his preparations to rob them of their bad effect.[56] If he has left his bivouac a couple of hours before dawn and moved, carefully feeling his way, in the direction of the enemy, and has perhaps driven in one of their outposts, he need not feel it incumbent on him to hold the ground gained _à outrance_. He has seen into their outpost line, gained certain information, and come to certain conclusions; therefore when the enemy attack him, as they certainly will do, he should have made all preparations to fall back to the bit of good ground previously selected, where he can see and where his movements cannot be seen. Here he can make a good show, and ten to one they will let him stay there. But instead of staying there with 100 men all day, which would fatigue his men and horses without result, he places some Cossack posts and a small picket or two and retires all the rest of his men, without the enemy’s knowledge, to his bivouac, and is at breakfast by 9 or 10 A.M., his horses watered and fed. At 4 P.M. he canters out to his posts, spends the remaining daylight in observation of the enemy’s movements, relief of posts, etc., and withdraws his Cossack posts and picket at dark, leaving the picket fires well stoked up; one or two men only are left to feed these fires at intervals through the night. His real line of night outposts is placed on the possible lines of advance to his bivouac. But if his bivouac can be observed, or is likely to be reported upon to the enemy, he may change it after dark. His men should have been practised so constantly in alarm posts at night that they know exactly where to go, and what to do in case of a night alarm, and how to do so in absolute silence. Only the C.O. may make a few uncomplimentary remarks about the enemy in a stentorian voice, and invite them to “come on,” which goes far to cool the ardour of a night attack and hearten up his own men.