Outlines of a Critical Theory of EthicsDewey, John
Philosophy
Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
Dewey, John
Ethics
2. The question now comes as to the nature of this tension. We may
call it 'feeling,' if we will, and say that feeling is the sole motive
power to action. But there is no such thing as feeling at large, and
the important thing, morally, is what _kind_ of feeling moves. To take
a mere abstraction like 'feeling' for the source of action is, at
root, the fallacy of hedonism. To raise the question, What is it that
makes the feeling what it is, is to recognize that the feeling, taken
concretely, is _character_ in a certain attitude.
Stephen, who has insisted with great force that feeling
is the sole 'motive' to action, has yet shown with equal
cogency the moral uselessness of such a doctrine, when
feeling is left undefined (Op. cit., p. 44). "The love of
happiness must express the sole possible motive of Judas
Iscariot and his master; it must explain the conduct of
Stylites on his column, of Tiberius at Capreæ, of A Kempis
in his cell, and of Nelson in the cockpit of the Victory.
It must be equally good for saints, martyrs, heroes,
cowards, debauchees, ascetics, mystics, cynics, misers,
prodigals, men, women, and babes in arms." Surely, this is
only to say, in effect, that 'love of happiness' is a pure
bit of scholasticism, an undefined entity.
In a hedonistic argument (by Stanton Coit, Mind, Vol. XI, p. 349),
the fallacy is seen in the following discussion. The story is told of
Abraham Lincoln that he once passed an animal in distress by the side
of the road, and that, after going by, he finally went back and got
him out of the ditch. On being praised for his act, he replied that he
did it on his own account, since he kept getting more uncomfortable as
he thought of the animal in distress. From this, it cannot be inferred
that love of pleasure is at the basis of moral acts. The mere lumping
off of feeling as the spring of conduct overlooks the only important
thing morally--the fact that Lincoln felt pain at the thought of the
animal unrelieved, and pleasure at the idea of its relief, just because
he was a man of compassionate _character_. It was not the feeling, but
the character revealed in, and creative of, the feeling that was the
real source of the act.
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