These various operations in the East vigorously taken in hand, as the General Staff at Berlin knows so well how to do, would require four or five months for their execution. This interval of time, combined with the depressing moral effect brought about by the supposed German victories, would act, as it were, as an automatic preparation for the final Teutonic offensive on the Western front. It must be remembered that during these four or five months the submarine warfare, pursued more and more ruthlessly, would considerably impede neutral navigation and decimate the tonnage of the Franco-British merchant marine. The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the Allies would be enormously increased. Even if their pressure has forced the Kaiser to evacuate a considerable portion of France and Belgium, the importance of this retreat would be only relative, for it would be temporary. Following our hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten, the army of Saloniki driven into the sea, and the food crisis in the West intensified, the moral depression and discouragement among the soldiers and civilians of France would be most profound. Under the given material and psychological conditions, the concentration of all the Pan-German forces on the Western front would probably permit them to break through. This would spell ruin for France and for England as well, and assure that decisive German victory which would mean the mastery of Europe. If this theoretical German plan is to be accomplished in 1917, however, the general technical situation in Europe must remain much as it stands at present. No new power capable of making itself felt on the battlefield must come to the support of the Allies. It is necessary, then, that the scheme be carried out in 1917, before the Russian Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the Allies, has time to repair the damage done by the former régime, and before the United States, realizing that it is to their vital interest to take part directly and without delay in the war on the Continent, are ready to do so effectively. The tactics of Berlin, after being forced to a diplomatic rupture with Washington, consist in doing everything to avoid actual blows with the United States, while keeping up a vigorous submarine campaign, and in making frantic efforts to effect a miscarriage of American military preparation—especially as regards sending reinforcements to Europe. In pursuance of this scheme, Berlin instructed Vienna to send Washington a dilatory answer concerning submarine warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and thus gain time. This procedure was specifically intended to make America believe that Austro-Hungary can act independently of Germany. And so, by virtue of this delusion, William II veils the existence of that Pan-Germany whose reality, for the sake of his plans, must not be revealed until the latest possible moment. II