The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid excessive risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle, on the hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. Everything favors concerted action by the United States and the Allies. Their material and moral interests are identical, and, in doing away with autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified distrust felt in the United States for the land of the Tsars. As we have seen, a German victory over Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, the breaking of the Western front, would be unquestionably the most dangerous eventuality imaginable for the future security of the United States. American interest therefore demands, not only that support should be given France and Great Britain, but that the United States should hasten to help the Russians, who will probably be called on first to meet the onslaught. On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even find it worth while to give further thought to an idea which, a few months ago, would have seemed preposterous to them. Since President Wilson cherishes the ideal of the brotherhood of nations,—a noble conception, but one which can be realized only after Prussian militarism is ground in the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns have gone the way of the Romanoffs,—why should not this world-crisis provide an opportunity for intimate coöperation between the United States and Japan? Even if Americans were to admit the necessity of so doing, it will be long before they are in the position to throw into the European conflict those reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive influence, would hasten the end of the mad slaughter. At the present moment Japan alone, outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained army capable of taking the field at once. Everything considered, President Wilson might well decide that the interests of humanity called for the intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out as the great, decisive figure of the war. From the technical point of view, it is certain that victory for the Allies calls for a simultaneous concentric attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For that reason, Japanese troops on the Russian line, at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and Saloniki, would furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with the supplementary strength that they need to achieve decisive results and so hasten the end of the whole war.