Let me again urge my point that the line of action morally and materially most profitable to the United States is that which, by achieving the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prussian militarism, will terminate the horrible carnage once for all. This is the moral pointed by the past. If the Allies had undertaken the Saloniki-Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 1915, the war would have ended a year ago. If you, Americans, had cast your lot with us a year ago, it would be ending about now. If you act to-day, with all your energies, and especially if you compass the Japanese intervention, you will save the lives of millions of men who, without your military and diplomatic support, will surely be sacrificed. The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This is the one and only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism which threatens the liberty of the world. CHAPTER VI PAN-GERMANY’S STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS In April last, when it was generally believed in Paris that the Revolution at Petrograd made certain the end of German influence over the vast former Empire of the Tsars, I wrote the study referred to on page 81 and reprinted here as Chapters IV and V.[1] I then said, [In Russia] ‘Where conditions were ripe for idealistic extremists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the prevalence of the latter condition. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dissolve.’ Unhappily, events have justified this word of caution in only too full measure. The efforts of the Allies to reorganize the forces of Russia have thus far met with small success. It is a task to which their duty and their interests alike make it imperative for them to devote themselves with their utmost strength. But we must cherish no illusions. The rebuilding of the forces of Russia must inevitably be a long, arduous, and doubtful undertaking. It is advisable, therefore, to consider, at the same time, if there is not some method of making up for the Russian default by bringing into play, to further the victory of the Entente, certain powerful forces which the Allies have not thus far even thought of employing.