If Buel had been guilty of such blundering (not to call it by any worse name than this) it would have been impossible to make the country at the North believe that he did not meditate its destruction. For this blunder Grant was promptly relieved of his command, by the proper authorities, and it was many years afterwards, before anyone was found, who did not think this was very moderate punishment, under such circumstances. The fault in the case under consideration differs in kind, but not in its disastrous effects upon our cause and our army. The right of our army at Murfreesboro, judging from what happened (and as I said at the outset, when I don't know personally what happened, I speak from necessary inference) seemed to think that inasmuch as our plan of battle contemplated an attack by the extreme left, to be followed up by them subsequently during the day, that they had nothing to do at that early hour in the morning, but to keep a picket force out, send their artillery horses to a distant point for water, stack their arms, and get breakfast. They did not seem to think possibly Bragg might have plans of his own, and that our attack might be anticipated, and that our right might receive a desperate attack while our left was preparing to deliver one. This, as you all know, was what happened, and you all know its disastrous results. Current reports at the time were to the effect that the right was found when the attack came upon them in the condition already described, and the prompt manner in which they were hurled from the field, corroborates this view of the case. This, of course, caused the troops to their left to be immediately out-flanked, and no resistance, to amount to anything, from that portion of our line could be expected under such circumstances. How much Gen. Rosecrans and his staff are properly to blame for the state of things existing on the right at the time of the attack, I have no means of knowing, and do not undertake to say but that it was the prime cause of the very serious disaster to our arms, and to the prestige of our army that happened at that battle, there can be no doubt or chance for two opinions. How the battle raged, and what happened, so far as I then knew, I cannot better describe than by extracting from my official report of that day's proceedings, made on the 6th of January, following, and which I do as follows: HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE, 1ST DIV'N, LEFT WING, NEAR MURFREESBORO', TENN., Jan. 6, 1863. _Capt. M.P. Bestow, A.A.A.G._: