A. "That Protagoras was not speaking about bridges, or any other merely physical things, on which no difference of opinion need occur, because every one can satisfy himself by simply using his senses; but concerning moral and intellectual matters, which are not cognisable by the senses, and therefore permit, without blame, a greater diversity of opinion. Error on such points, he told us-on the subject of religion, for example-was both pardonable and harmless; for no blame could be imputed to the man who acted faithfully up to his own belief, whatsoever that might be." S. "Bravely spoken of him, and worthily of a free state. But tell me, Alcibiades, with what matters does religion deal?" A. "With the Gods." S. "Then it is not hurtful to speak false things of the Gods?" A. "Not unless you know them to be false." S. "But answer me this, Alcibiades. If you made a mistake concerning numbers, as that twice two made five, might it not be hurtful to you?" A. "Certainly; for I might pay away five obols instead of four." S. "And so be punished, not by any anger of two and two against you, but by those very necessary laws of number, which you had mistaken?" A. "Yes." S. "Or if you made a mistake concerning music, as that two consecutive notes could produce harmony, that opinion also, if you acted upon it, would be hurtful to you?" A. "Certainly; for I should make a discord, and pain my own ears, and my hearers'." S. "And in this case also, be punished, not by any anger of the lyre against you, but by those very necessary laws of music which you had mistaken?" A. "Yes." S. "Or if you mistook concerning a brave man, believing him to be a coward, might not this also be hurtful to you? If, for instance, you attacked him carelessly, expecting him to run away, and he defended himself valiantly, and conquered you; or if you neglected to call for his help in need, expecting him falsely, as in the former case, to run away; would not such a mistake be hurtful to you, and punish you, not by any anger of the man against you, but by your mistake itself?" A. "It is evident." S. "We may assume, then, that such mistakes at least are hurtful, and that they are liable to be punished by the very laws of that concerning which we mistake?" A. "We may so assume."