S. "Suppose, then, we were to say: 'What argument is this of yours, Protagoras?-that concerning lesser things, both intellectual and moral, such as concerning number, music, or the character of a man, mistakes are hurtful, and liable to bring punishment, in proportion to our need of using those things: but concerning the Gods, the very authors and lawgivers of number, music, human character, and all other things whatsoever, mistakes are of no consequence, nor in any way hurtful to man, who stands in need of their help, not only in stress of battle, once or twice in his life, as he might of the brave man, but always and in all things both outward and inward? Does it not seem strange to you, for it does to me, that to make mistakes concerning such beings should not bring an altogether infinite and daily punishment, not by any resentment of theirs, but, as in the case of music or numbers, by the very fact of our having mistaken the laws of their being, on which the whole universe depends?'-What do you suppose Protagoras would be able to answer, if he faced the question boldly?" A. "I cannot tell." S. "Nor I either. Yet one thing more it may be worth our while to examine. If one should mistake concerning God, will his error be one of excess, or defect?" A. "How can I tell?" S. "Let us see. Is not Zeus more perfect than all other beings?" A. "Certainly, if it be true that, as they say, the perfection of each kind of being is derived from him; he must therefore be himself more perfect than any one of those perfections." S. "Well argued. Therefore, if he conceived of himself, his conception of himself would be more perfect than that of any man concerning him?" A. "Assuredly; if he have that faculty, he must needs have it in perfection." S. "Suppose, then, that he conceived of one of his own properties, such as his justice; how large would that perfect conception of his be?" A. "But how can I tell, Socrates?" S. "My good friend, would it not be exactly commensurate with that justice of his?" A. "How then?" S. "Wherein consists the perfection of any conception, save in this, that it be the exact copy of that whereof it is conceived, and neither greater nor less?" A. "I see now." S. "Without the Pythia's help, I should say. But, tell me-We agree that Zeus's conception of his own justice will be exactly commensurate with his justice?" A. "We do." S. "But man's conception thereof, it has been agreed, would be certainly less perfect than Zeus's?" A. "It would." S. "Man, then, it seems, would always conceive God to be less just than God conceives himself to be?" A. "He would." S. "And therefore to be less just, according to the argument, than he really is?" A. "True." S. "And therefore his error concerning Zeus, would be in this case an error of defect?" A. "It would." S. "And so on of each of his other properties?" A. "The same argument would likewise, as far as I can see, apply to them."