Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
Animals, have; and confines all sense onely to Animal sense, and all
knowledg to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, _That Matter is
utterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and
that therefore there is something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal;
for we find in our selves that one and the same thing, both hears,
and sees, and tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that
Nature manifests unto us._ I answer, That is the reason there is but
one matter, and that all natural perception is made by the animate
part of matter; but although there is but one matter in Nature, yet
there are several parts or degrees, and consequently several actions
of that onely matter, which causes such a variety of perceptions,
both sensitive and rational: the sensitive perception is made by the
sensitive corporeal motions, copying out the figures of forreign
objects in the sensitive organs of the sentient; and if those sensitive
motions do pattern out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike
at one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch and smell,
at one and the same time: But Thoughts and Passions, as Imagination,
Conception, Fancy, Memory, Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are
made by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of matter,
to wit, the rational. And thus all perception is made by one and the
same matter, through the variety of its actions or motions, making
various and several figures, both sensitive and rational. But all this
variety in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational perceptions,
is not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by changing their own
parts of matter into several figures by the power of self-motion: For
example, I see a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my
eye, in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the adjoyning
parts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight upon the sight of
the Man or Beast make the like figure in the sensitive organ, the Eye,
and in the eyes own substance or matter, as being in the eye as well
as the other degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate,
for they are all mixt together. But this is to be observed, That the
rational matter can and doth move in its own substance, as being the
purest and subtillest degree of matter; but the sensitive being not so
pure and subtil, moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so the
perceptive figures which the rational Matter, or rational corporeal
Motions make, are made in their own degree of Matter; but those figures
which the sensitive patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of
the sentient body proper to such or such a sense or perception: as in
an animal Creature, the perception of sight is made by the sensitive
corporeal motions in the Eye; the perception of hearing, in the Ear,
and so forth. As for what your _Author_ says, _That we cannot conceive
any portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft_; I answer, That
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