Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
_If there be any sense and perception in Matter_, says your Author,[1]
_it must needs be Motion or Reaction of one part of matter against
another; and that all diversity of sense and perception doth
necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure,
Posture, Vigour and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In
which variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such, as are
impressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that are perceptions
of some actions, or modificated Impressions of parts of matter
bearing one against another._ I have declared, _Madam_, my opinion
concerning Perception in my former Letters, that all Perception is
not Impression and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Wax: For
example, the corporeal rational motions in the mind do not print,
but move figuratively; but the sensitive motions do carve, print,
engrave, and, as it were, pencil out, as also move figuratively in
productions, and do often take patterns from the rational figures, as
the rational motions make figures according to the sensitive patterns;
But the rational can move without patterns, and so the sensitive: For
surely, were a man born blind, deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his
exterior parts, the sensitive and rational motions would nevertheless
move both in body and mind according to the nature of his figure; for
though no copies were taken from outward objects, yet he would have
thoughts, passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could not
see exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no question but
he would see and hear interiously after the manner of dreams, onely
they might not be any thing like to what is perceiveable by man in the
World; but if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something
equivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as Words, yet he
would hear something equivalent to words; for it is impossible, that
his sensitive and rational faculties should be lost for want of an Ear,
or an Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior object, or marks,
or patterns: for although the sensitive Motions do usually pattern out
the figures of exterior objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can
make interior figures without such objects. Wherefore Perception is not
always Reaction, neither is Perception and Reaction really one thing;
for though Perception and Action is one and the same, yet not always
Reaction; but did Perception proceed from the reaction of outward
objects, a blind and deaf man would not so much as dream; for he would
have no interior motion in the head, having no other exterior sense but
touch, which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease, he would
neither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and interiously feel nothing
but hunger and fulness; and his Mind would be as Irrational as some
imagine Vegetables and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave them,
and rest,
Madam,
_Your Faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
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